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ARTICLE 
DIAGNOSTICS NEED NOT APPLY 
REBECCA S. EISENBERG* 
Diagnostic testing helps caregivers and patients understand a patient's 
condition, predict future outcomes, select appropriate treatments, and 
determine whether treatment is working. Improvements in diagnostic testing 
are essential to bringing about the long-heralded promise of personalized 
medicine. 1 Yet it seems increasingly clear that most important advances in this 
type of medical technology lie outside the boundaries of patent-eligible subject 
matter. 2 The clarity of this conclusion has been obscured by ambiguity in the 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning patent eligibility. Since its 
20 1 0  decision in Bilski v. Kappos,3 the Court has followed a discipline of 
limiting judicial exclusions from the statutory categories of patentable subject 
matter to a finite list repeatedly articulated in the Court's own prior decisions 
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law· School. I 
gratefully acknowledge the support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University 
of M ichigan. This article benefited from helpful comments of workshop participants at the 
University of Michigan Law School and Boston University Law School. 
1 See, e.g. , Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet: President Obama 's Precision 
Medicine Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 20 1 5), available at 
http://www. hitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 5/0 I /30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s­
precision-medicine-initiative (archived at http://perma.cc/5HJN-3KMU); see generally U.S. 
Fooo & DRUG ADMIN., Paving the Way for Personalized Medicine: FDA 's Role in a New 
Era of Medical Product Development (20 I 3), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PersonalizedMedicine/UC 
M37242 I .pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/34F9-3AFX). 
2 See, e.g. , Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 1 32 S.  Ct. 1 289 (20 1 2); 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d. 1 37 1  (Fed. Cir. 20 1 5); In re BRCA I - & 
BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d. 755 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 4); 
U.S.P.T.O., 20 1 4  Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 746 1 8  
(Dec. 1 6, 2014); U.S.P.T.O., July 20 1 5  Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-po licy/2014-interim­
guidance-subject-matter-el igibil ity-O (last visited Sept. 1 1 , 20 15) (archived at 
http://perma.cc/HEW6-79NE). 
3 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (201 0). 
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for "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,"4 while declining 
to embrace other judicial exclusions that were never expressed in Supreme 
Court opinions. 5 The result has been a series of decisions that, while upending 
a quarter century of lower court decisions6 and administrative practice, 7 
purport to be a straightforward application of ordinary principles of stare 
decisis. 8 As the implications of these decisions are worked out, the Court's 
robust understanding of the exclusions for laws of nature and abstract ideas 
seems to leave little room for patent protection for diagnostics. 
This Article reviews recent decisions on patent-eligibility from the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit to demonstrate the obstacles to patenting 
diagnostic methods under emerging law. Although the courts have used 
different analytical approaches in recent cases, the bottom line is consistent: 
diagnostic applications are not patent eligible. I then consider what the absence 
of patents might mean for the future of innovation in diagnostic testing. 
4 E.g. , Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75, 1 85 ( 1 98 1 ); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.  
303,  309 ( 1 980). Other Supreme Court articulations of the traditional exclusions vary 
somewhat, sometimes including "mental processes" and "abstract intellectual concepts." 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.  63, 67 ( 1972); see also MacKay Radio & Tele. Co. v. Radio 
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 ( 1 939) (holding that "scientific truth, or the mathematical 
expression of it, is not [patentable]"). 
5 This is most clearly evident from the multiple opinions in the unanimous decision of 
the Supreme Court in Bilski, 561  U.S. (upholding a rejection of a patent claim to a method 
of hedging risks in commodities trading for lack of patentable subject matter) . However, 
although some lower court decisions had been understood to hold that "business methods" 
were not patent-eligible, only four justices were ready to exclude "business methods" from 
patentable subject matter in so many words. E.g. id. at 6 1 3  (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 
657 (Breyer, J., concurring). Yet the justices unanimously concluded that the particular 
claims at issue were an impermissible effort to patent an "abstract idea." Id. at 609 (majority 
opinion); id. at 6 1 9-20 (opinion of Stevens, J . ,  concurring); id. at 658 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). See also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'!., 1 34 S. Ct. 2347 (20 1 4) (holding 
computer-mediated method for mitigating settlement risk in a financial transaction through 
the use ofa third-party intermediary unpatentable as an "abstract idea"). 
6 E.g. , Bilski, 561  U.S. at 6 1 2  ("The patent application here can be rejected under our 
precedents on the un-patentability of abstract ideas. The Court, therefore, need not define 
further what constitutes a patentable "process," beyond pointing to the definition of that 
term provided in § I OO(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr. And 
nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § I 0 I that the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past."). 
7 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1 333 (reviewing history of PTO 
allowance of patent claims on isolated DNA molecules over 30-year period). 
8 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07, 
2 1 1 7- 1 9  (2013) (isolated DNA molecules not eligible for patent protection because they 
"fell squarely within the law of nature exception," notwithstanding past practice of Patent & 
Trademark Office of awarding gene patents). See also Bilski, 561 U.S.  
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THE QUIET PERIOD AFTER DIAMOND V. CHAKRABARTY 
For three decades, beginning with the 1980 decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty and ending with the 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappas, the 
Supreme Court did not hold any patents invalid for lack of patent-eligible 
subject matter. Before that period, a line of Supreme Court decisions had held 
that patent-eligible subject matter does not include laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, abstract ideas, or mathematical algorithms. 9 Although the Court 
never repudiated these older cases, beginning in 1980 it seemed to take a more 
generous approach to patent-eligible subject matter.10 These · post-1980 
decisions stressed the breadth of the statutory language defining patentable 
subject matter 11 and quoted legislative history indicating that patentable 
subject matter includes "anything under the sun that is made by man."12 In the 
first decades following the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (the Federal Circuit), 13 the old limits on patentable subject matter 
seemed lost in antiquity. Biotechnology firms and universities obtained patents 
on discoveries in the life sciences and asserted these patents against infringers 
in the courts without serious challenge to their patent eligibility.14 
During this period the Federal Circuit sometimes balked at the broad reach 
of patent claims on discoveries of basic biological mechanisms and held them 
invalid, but not for lack of patent-eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit 
relied on other statutory provisions, including a robust interpretation of the 
requirement that a patent claim must be supported by an adequate "written 
description" of the invention, 15 to prevent performers of basic research from 
obtaining broad patents that would dominate future work of others. 16 The 
9 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 ( 1 978); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 7 1 -72; Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 ( 1948). 
10 J .E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'!, Inc., 534 U.S. 1 24 (200 1 )  (upholding 
patent-eligibility of com seed); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75 ( 1 98 1 )  (upholding patent­
eligibility of method of curing synthetic. rubber using computer-implemented algorithm to 
calculate cure time); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.  303 ( 1 980) (upholding patent 
eligibility of genetically-engineered microorganism). 
1 1  35 U.S.C. § I O I  (20 1 2) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title."). 
12 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1 979, at 5 ( 1 952); H.R. Rep. 
No. 82- 1 923, at 6 ( 1 952)). 
1 3 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1 982, Pub. L. No. 97- 1 64, 96 Stat. 25 ( 1 982). 
14 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable 
Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In  re Bilski, 3 J .L. TECH. & INTERNET I ,  9- 1 0  
(20 1 1 ). 
1 5 35 U.S.C. § 1 12 (20 1 2); see, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1 336 
(Fed. Cir. 20 I O); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 9 1 6  (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1 1 9 F.3d 1 559 (Fed. Cir. 1 997). 
1 6 Ariad Pharm.,  598 F.3d at 1 353 ("Such claims merely recite a description of the 
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Federal Circuit justified this approach as reflecting a policy of confining the 
patent system to "useful arts" rather than basic research: 
Ariad complains that the [written description] doctrine 
disadvantages universities to the extent that basic research 
cannot be patented. But the patent law has always been 
directed to the 'useful Arts,' U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
meaning inventions with a practical use. . . . Patents are not 
awarded for academic theories, no matter how 
groundbreaking or necessary to the later patentable inventions 
of others. ' [A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a 
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion.' Requiring a written description of the invention 
limits patent protection to those who actually perform the 
difficult work of 'invention' -that is, conceive of the 
complete and final invention with all its claimed 
limitations-and disclose the fruits of that effort to the 
public.17 
Meanwhile the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), facing a deluge of 
patent applications on newly identified DNA sequences of unknown function, 
limited patents on these early stage discoveries through more robust 
enforcement of the requirement that a patent application must disclose a 
specific and substantial utility for an invention.18 The Federal Circuit approved 
of this approach in affirming rejection of claims to gene fragments of unknown 
function: 
The claimed [DNA molecules] are not an end of Fisher's 
research effort, but only tools to be used along the way in the 
search for a practical utility. Thus, while [they] may add a 
noteworthy contribution to biotechnology research, . . . we 
hold that the claimed [molecules] have not been researched 
and understood to the point of providing an immediate, well­
defined, real world benefit to the public meriting the grant of 
a patent.19 
These Federal Circuit decisions articulate concerns similar to those 
expressed by the Supreme Court in patentable subject matter cases about the 
importance of preventing premature patents on basic research discoveries, as 
distinguished from practical applications. But rather than holding these 
discoveries to be outside the scope of patentable subject matter, the Federal 
Circuit and the PTO used other levers in the patent system to limit the 
problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and . . . leaving it to the 
pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished invention."). 
17 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
18 35 U.S.C. §§ I O I ,  1 12; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U .S.  5 1 9  ( 1 966); U .S.P.T.O., Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1 092 (Jan. 5, 200 1 ). 
19 In re Fisher, 42 1 F.3d 1 365, 1 376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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availability of broad dominant patent claims on fundamental discoveries. 
The Federal Circuit approach did not prevent the issuance of patents on a 
new generation of diagnostic inventions. Diagnostic tests typically involve 
measuring one or more variables in a patient (e.g., body temperature, white 
blood cell count) and comparing those observations to reference values to 
make an inference about the patient's condition, prognosis, or treatment 
response. A wealth of new genomic information that became available in the 
wake of the Human Genome Project provided an abundant source of new 
biomarkers to use in diagnostic testing. Patent applicants might claim either the 
markers themselves (e.g., newly identified genes or gene fragments or 
mutations associated with disease) or a method of diagnosis that involves 
observing markers in patients and comparing the patients' markers to standard 
values or ranges (e.g., variants of a gene sequence that are or are not predictive 
of disease) to make an inference about the patient's health or condition. 
The usefulness of these tests for diagnostic purposes could provide "an 
immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public" sufficient to satisfy 
the utility requirement. 20 Yet even after identifying the disease relevance of a 
gene or other marker, much more work may be necessary to identify additional 
mutations associated with disease, to understand the disease pathway, and to 
develop treatments. Research scientists feared that broad patents at this early 
stage would interfere with this further research. Some empirical studies 
suggested that in fact, patents rarely interfered with the work of academic 
researchers, 21 perhaps because researchers simply ignored whatever patents 
they might infringe.22 Nonetheless, some notable exceptions23 nurtured 
outspoken opposition to gene patenting among influential organizations of 
scientists and doctors. 24 Some of these organizations ultimately became 
20 Id. 
2 1 See, e.g. , Timothy Caulfield et al ., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human 
Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1 09 1  (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 45 Haus. L. REv. I 059 (2008) (providing a summary and analysis of the 
evidence); John P. Walsh et al ., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 
Science 2002 (2005). 
22 Katherine J. Strandburg, Sharing Research Tools and Materials: Homo Scientificus 
and User Innovator Community Norms (2008) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/1 0 .21 39/ssrn. 1 1 36606 (archived at http://perma.cc/Q6YN-R2BK). 
23 The most notable exception was patents on the BRCA 1 and BRCA2 breast cancer 
genes controlled by Myriad Genetics. See E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad 
Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 1 2(4) Genetics in Med. S39-S70 (April 20 1 0); see 
also Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and license on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services 5 J .  Molecular Diagnostics 3-8 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al., 
Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents Are Illustrated by the Case of 
Haemochromatosis, 4 1 5  Nature 577, 579 (2002). 
24 See generally U.S.  Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Report of the Secretary's  
Advisory Committee on  Genetics, Health, and Society, Gene Patents and Licensing 
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plaintiffs in a lawsuit challenging the validity of patent claims related to the 
BRCAl and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer susceptibility. 25 
THE ALARM BELL: LABORATORY CORPORATION V. METABOLITE LABORATORIES 
While the litigation over BRCA gene patents was pending, three justices 
gave an early signal that the broader universe of patents on diagnostic tests 
could be vulnerable to challenge in a 2006 dissenting opinion from a decision 
to dismiss certiorari in the case of Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite 
Laboratories.26 The patent in that case included the following broad claim to a 
diagnostic method: 
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in 
warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: 
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total 
homocysteine; and 
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said 
body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. 27 
The lower courts did not consider whether this claim raised a problem of 
patentable subject matter, 28 and a majority of the Court ultimately decided to 
dismiss the case without reaching the merits. 29 But three dissenting justices 
were ready to invalidate the patent as violating the principle that one may not 
patent "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."30 The 
dissenters recognized that the category of natural phenomena is "not easy to 
define,"31 but they were nonetheless so certain that "the correlation between 
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural 
phenomenon"'32 that they saw no need to attempt a definition because the 
claim "is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that 
doctrine. "33 
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests (April 20 I 0) available at 
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_patents_report_201 0.pdf (archived at 
http://perma.cc/RT2Y-7TYT) [hereinafter SACGHS Final Report]. 
25 Original plaintiffs in this action included the Association for Molecular Pathology, the 
American College of M edical Genetics, the American Society for Clinical Pathology, the 
College of American Pathologists, in addition to individual research scientists. Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 669 F. Supp. 2d. 365, 370-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
26 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 1 24 (2006) (Breyer, 
J . ,  dissenting, joined by Stevens, J. and Souter, J.). 
27 Id. at 1 29 
28 Id. at 1 32.  
29 Id. at 1 25 (majority opinion). 
30 Id. at 1 26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 1 75, 1 85 
( 1 98 1 )). 
31 Id. at 1 34. 
32 Id. at 1 35.  
33 Id. ("[T]his case is not at the boundary. It does not require us to consider the precise 
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Dissenting opinions are not law,34 but this dissent was a harbinger of a 
significant shift in the Court's attitude towards patent eligibility. It is worth 
pausing to consider just why the dissenters thought the recited correlation 
between elevated levels of homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was a "natural 
phenomenon" that called for the same treatment as E=rnc2, the law of gravity, 
and the heat of the sun. 35 The opinion identifies a clear rationale in prior cases 
for the exclusion: that patents on "the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work" might do more to impede than to promote scientific and 
technological progress. 36 Nonetheless, the opinion does not use that rationale 
to clarify the distinction between natural phenomena and patent-eligible 
inventions in the claim at issue. 37 
Perhaps they meant that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin 
levels is an inherent regularity that exists apart from any human intervention. 
In other words, if one could somehow observe the levels of homocysteine, 
cobalamin, and folate in a set of people, one would see in individuals with 
elevated homocysteine levels a corresponding deficiency in cobalamin and 
folate; the correlation is therefore a natural phenomenon rather than a human 
invention. But this framing ignores the (unnatural) technology of medical 
diagnosis that is necessary to give meaning to the claim. The claim language 
requires not only the observation of biomarker levels in a patient, but also the 
characterization of certain levels as elevated or deficient. 38 Nature does not 
scope of the 'natural phenomenon' doctrine or any other difficult issue. In my view, claim 
1 3  is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that doctrine. There can be 
little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in 
claim 1 3  is a 'natural phenomenon.'"). Id. 
34 The Federal Circuit explicitly declined to consider the analysis set forth in the 
laboratpry Corporation dissent and faulted the District Court for relying on that opinion in 
its own decisions in Prometheus. See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 58 1  
F.3d 1 336, 1 346 n .3  (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied 
heavily on the opinion of three justices dissenting from the dismissal of the grant of 
certiorari in laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite laboratories, Inc . . . . 
That dissent is not controlling law and also involved different claims from the ones at issue 
here."); on remand, Prometheus labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. , 628 F.3d 1 347, 1 356 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 0) ("Again, with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not 
controlling law, and it involved different claims from the ones at issue here."). 
35 lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 1 26. 
36 Id. at 1 26-27 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 ( 1 972)). 
37 Id. at 1 34 ("Nor can one easily use such abstract categories directly to distinguish 
instances of l ikely beneficial, from likely harmful, forms of protection."). 
38 One might object that the claim language does not specify what counts as an elevated 
level of homocysteine or a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. If these levels are not defined 
elsewhere in the patent specification, that imprecision might make the claim invalid for 
indefiniteness. 35 U.S.C. § 1 1 2 (20 1 2). The Supreme Court has fortified this statutory 
requirement in a more recent case. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U .S. 1 24, 
1 37 (20 1 4). Ruling years before the Nautilus decision, the Federal Circuit considered and 
rejected a challenge to the validity of Claim 1 3  on this basis. Metabolite Labs., Inc., v. Lab. 
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specify when homocysteine levels are elevated and when vitamin levels are 
deficient. These diagnostic conclusions reflect human judgments about the 
difference between sickness and health that are not inherent in nature. They are 
human constructs that belong to the applied technology of medical diagnosis. 
In Justice Breyer's paraphrase, "the process is no more than an instruction to 
read some numbers in light of medical knowledge."39 But the "medical 
knowledge" embedded in the claim is a technological filter that identifies 
which numbers to consider, and specifies when those numbers call for medical 
attention. 
Near the end of the dissent, Justice Breyer candidly reveals a concern that 
patent claims might impinge on the practice of medicine, as distinguished from 
future research. 40 Although the principle justification he cites for the exclusion 
of "natural phenomena" from patent eligibility looks to the interests of 
researchers,41 Justice Breyer's justification for reaching the merits without the 
benefit of prior consideration of the issue in the lower courts focuses on the 
interests of doctors and patients: 
[S]pecial public interest considerations reinforce my view 
that we should decide this case. To fail to do so threatens to 
leave the medical profession subject to the restrictions 
imposed by this individual patent and others of its kind. 
Those restrictions may inhibit doctors from using their best 
medical judgment; they may force doctors to spend 
unnecessary time and energy to enter into license agreements; 
they may divert resources from the medical task of health 
care to the legal task of searching patent files for similar 
simple correlations; they may raise the cost of healthcare 
while inhibiting its effective delivery. 42 
Perhaps these "special considerations" motivated the dissenters not only to 
reach the merits, but also to interpret the traditional exclusion for natural 
phenomena broadly in order to limit patents on medical technologies. Patents 
undoubtedly increase costs and restrict utilization of patented inventions, in 
medicine as in other fields. 43 But so far neither the courts nor Congress have 
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1 354, 1 363-5 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
39 lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 1 37 .  
40 Id. at  1 38. 
41 Id. at 1 26-27 ("The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws 
of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. . . .  The 
problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing 
monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by 
impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the 
use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming 
searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and 
by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so. "). 
42 Id. at 1 38 .  
43 See id. at 1 27 ("[Patents] can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of 
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embraced a categorical exclusion of medical technologies from patent 
eligibility. Instead, Congress enacted a statutory exclusion of certain remedies 
for patent infringement against medical practitioners and related health care 
entities. 44 Indeed, the dissenters cited this legislation as a reason to decide the 
case so as to "help Congress determine whether legislation is needed. "45 
Perhaps the Laboratory Corporation dissenters intended to sound an alarm bell 
for Congress to take notice of diagnostic method patents and to address their 
implications for healthcare. 46 But those policy considerations are quite distinct 
from those that the dissenters identify in the older cases that support the 
exclusion of natural laws and natural phenomena from patent eligibility in 
order to leave "basic building blocks" free for use in future scientific and 
technological work. 
DIAGNOSTICS AS "NATURAL LA ws," NOT "APPLICATIONS": MA YO 
COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES 
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of patent-eligibility for diagnostic 
methods six years later in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories.47 Justice Breyer's opinion for a unanimous court echoed the 
approach of the Laboratory Corporation dissent, again asserting that the claim 
at issue set forth "laws of nature" without defining that term. 48 The opinion 
information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented 
ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time consuming searches of existing or 
pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of 
using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so."). 
44 These l imitations were a last-minute addition to an appropriations bill and are codified 
at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (20 1 2) .  
45  Lab. Corp. of Am.  Holding, 548 U.S. at 1 38. Just a few years later, the Court in  Bilski 
v. Kappos drew a very different conclusion from a later Congressional enactment that 
l imited the enforcement of certain patents on business methods. American Inventors 
Protection Act of 1 999, Pub. L. No. 1 06-1 1 3, 1 1 3 Stat. 1 50 1 A-552, 1 5 1 0A-555-6 ( 1 999), 
codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (20 1 2). In an opinion not signed by any of the 
Laboratory Corporation dissenters, the Bilski majority interpreted legislation providing a 
novel defense against business method patents as an indication that Congress must consider 
business methods to be within patentable subject matter. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 
606-07 (20 1 0). 
46 In fact, as part of the America Invents Act of 201 1 Congress directed the PTO 
Director to "conduct a study on effective ways to provide independent, confirming genetic 
diagnostic test activity where gene patents and exclusive licensing for primary genetic 
diagnostic tests exist" and to report the results of the study to Congress within nine months. 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 1 12-29, § 27 1 25 Stat. 284, 338 (20 1 1 ). The 
PTO held a public roundtable on diagnostic genetic testing in January 20 1 3 .  U.S.P.T.O., 
Notice of Public Roundtable on Diagnostic Genetic Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 7 1 1 70 (Nov. 29, 
201 2). The PTO has not delivered its report as of this writing. 
47 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 289 (20 1 2). 
48 Id. at 1 30 I .  
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followed a two-step approach to patent eligibility.49 The first step is to identify 
any excluded subject matter (such as natural laws or abstract ideas) in the 
patent claim. 50 The second step is to decide whether the claim adds enough 
beyond the excluded subject matter to be sure that it properly counts as a 
patent-eligible application of the excluded subject matter, rather than an 
impermissible claim to the excluded subject matter itself. 51  
The Court took a very expansive approach to the identification of natural 
phenomena in the first step of the analysis in Mayo. The claim at issue recited 
a method of optimizing the dosage of thiopurine drugs by monitoring drug 
metabolite levels to make sure they remained within a specified range: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a 
subject having said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said 
subject having said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol 
per 8xl08 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the 
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 
pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease 
the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject.52 
Like the claim at issue in Laboratory Corporation, this claim recites 
correlations between observed biomarker levels and diagnostic inferences. 53 
Yet a broader implicit definition of "laws of nature" is necessary to understand 
the Court's application of that label to the Mayo claim than was necessary to 
make sense of its application to the Laboratory Corporation claim. For one 
thing, the biomarkers that are observed in the Mayo claim are formed because 
of a medical intervention that does not occur in nature. 54 Elevated 
49 Although the exclusion that the Court considered in Prometheus was "natural laws," 
the Court drew its approach in significant part from prior decisions about the exclusion of 
"mathematical algorithms," especially Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.  175 (1981) and Parker 
v. Flook, 437 U.S.  584 (1978), and later used a similar analysis to determine whether a 
business method claim was an impermissible patent on an "abstract idea" in Alice 
Corporation v. CLS Bank, Int'[., 134 S. Ct. 1347 (2014). 
50 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
51 Id. at 1297-98. 
52 Id. at 1295. 
53 Id. at 1295-96. 
54 Id. at 1297. 
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homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiencies may well arise in the natural 
world without any human intervention (although, as noted above,55 these 
diagnostic characterizations represent human technological judgments rather 
than mere observations of nature). But nature does not administer thiopurine 
drugs to patients with immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders, nor does 
nature monitor the effects to determine the proper dosage for a particular 
patient. The claimed process to "a method of optimizing treatment" does not 
merely observe nature, but explicitly guides doctors on how to adjust the 
course of treatment in order to keep the effects of treatment within specified 
limits. These limits are not set by nature, but reflect human judgments about 
how to trade off the misery of immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders 
against the misery of drug side effects. This technological choice reflects 
human characterizations and preferences that are not inherent in nature. 
Plainly, Justice Breyer's understanding of what counts as laws of nature is 
not limited to phenomena that occur without human intervention: 
Prometheus' patents set forth laws of nature - namely, 
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in 
the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine 
drug will prove ineffective or cause harm . . . . While it take a 
human action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to 
trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person, 
the relation itself exists in principle apart from any human 
action. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which 
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body - entirely 
natural processes. 56 
This suggests a very broad definition of "laws of nature" that includes any 
prediction of the effects of medical treatment in a patient, because the Court 
evidently sees the body's responses to treatment as "entirely natural 
processes." It makes no difference that the response was set in motion by 
medical intervention. 
But identifying a law of nature is only the first step in the analysis. Justice 
Breyer recognizes that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest 
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas."57 He finds 
in the prior cases a limiting principle that prevents the exclusions from 
eviscerating patent law: although laws of nature, natural phenomena and 
abstract ideas themselves are un-patentable "as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work,"58 useful applications of these tools may be 
patent-eligible. A claim to a process that uses a natural law must "also contain 
other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
55 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
56 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 296-97. 
57 Id. at 1 293.  
58 Id. at 1 293 (citing Gottschalk v.  Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 ( 1 972)). 
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significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."59 To count as a 
patent-eligible application, the claim "must do more than simply state the law 
of nature while adding the words 'apply it."'60 
If all inventions make use of natural phenomena, laws of nature, and 
abstract ideas, it might seem that the real work of distinguishing patentable 
applications from un-patentable "laws of nature" must occur at step two of the 
analysis. But a close reading of the Mayo opinion suggests the opposite: one 
must understand the scope of the exclusions at step one in order to figure out 
what is left in the claims that might be sufficient to confer patent eligibility. In 
the case of diagnostic methods, the Court's broad understanding of what 
belongs in the category of "natural laws" prevents the Court from recognizing 
diagnosis as a form of applied technology at all. 
The Court concludes that the other elements of the Mayo claim do not "add 
enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they 
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws" 
because the steps of administering thiopurine drugs to a patient and measuring 
metabolite levels in tissue samples were "well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field." Some 
commentators have criticized this analysis as improperly conflating the 
requirements of patentable subject matter on one hand and the requirements of 
novelty and nonobviousness on the other hand,61 and some lower court 
decision have read the decision as limiting patent eligibility to "inventive 
applications" of natural laws, 62 although the PTO reads the decision more 
narrowly. 63 Understanding the opinion as requiring an "inventive application" 
59 Id. at 1 294. 
60 Id. 
61 Jeff Lefstin traces this conflation to the opinion of Justice Douglas in Funk v. Kala, 
333 U.S. 1 27 ( 1 948). Jeffrey A Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
565, 623-3 1 (20 1 5). 
62 Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom. 788 F.3d 1 37 1 ,  1 377 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 5) ("Because the 
method steps were well-understood, conventional and routine, the method of detecting 
paternally inherited cftDNA is not new and useful. The only subject matter new and useful 
as of the date of the application was the discovery of the presence of cftDNA in maternal 
plasma or serum."); id. at 1 379 (agreeing that the invention "combined and utilized man­
made tools of biotechnology in a new way that revolutionized prenatal care," but noting 
"that the Supreme Court instructs that "groundbreaking, innovative, or even bril l iant 
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 1 0 1  inquiry" (citing Myriad Genetics, 1 33 S. Ct. at 
2 1 1 7)). But cf Genetic Technologies, Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 
922, 929 (N.D. Cal. 201 4) (noting in response to argument that non-excluded claim 
elements consisted of "known prior art techniques" that "Agilent's arguments conflate the 
analysis of patent eligible subject matter under § I 0 I with analysis of novelty and non­
obviousness under §§ I 02 and 1 03 "). 
63 U.S.P.T.O., 20 1 4  Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 
746 1 8, 74624 (Dec. 1 6, 20 1 4) ("A claim directed to a judicial exception must be analyzed to 
determine whether the elements of the claim, considered both individually and as an ordered 
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of the natural laws suggests that perhaps a more innovative diagnostic method 
could prove patent-eligible in a future case. 
But the Court stops short of resting its determination of patent ineligibility 
on the fact that other claim steps were too conventional: 
We need not, and do not, now decide whether were the steps 
at issue here less conventional, these features of the claims 
would prove sufficient to invalidate. For here, as we have 
said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural laws 
themselves. 64 
This is the essential problem for diagnostic method claims under the Court's 
analysis: because the Court codes the heart of the diagnostic method - the 
determination of when it is appropriate to modify treatment for a particular 
patient - as belonging to the realm of natural laws, it does not recognize any 
application of those laws (whether "inventive" or "conventional") in the claim 
at all. 65 Despite the very specific criteria set forth in the final "wherein" 
clauses in the claim for determining when it is appropriate to adjust the drug 
dosage, the Court sees that language as reciting an excluded natural law rather 
than an application. 66 The Court thus concludes that the claim merely recites 
natural laws followed by a general instruction to "apply it" in some unspecified 
way: 
[T]he 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the 
relevant natural laws, at most adding a suggestion that he 
should take those laws into account when treating his 
patient . . . (rather like Einstein telling linear accelerator 
operators about his basic law and then trusting them to use it 
where relevant). 67 
The Einstein analogy seems fundamentally confused. The insight that e=mc2 
provides only the most basic starting point for "linear accelerator operators" 
who would need considerably more help to translate this insight into practical 
applications; indeed, the obvious magnitude of the remaining work and the 
varie1{' of applications that subsequent innovators might pursue is what makes 
e=mc a compelling example of the distinction between "natural laws" and 
applications of those laws.68 By contrast, the
.
Mayo claim explains exactly how 
to apply the recited correlations in the treatment of patients. 69 There is no 
combination, are sufficient to ensure that the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more 
than the exception itself . . .  Individual elements viewed on their own may not appear to add 
significantly more to the claim, but when combined may amount to significantly more than 
the exception."). 
64 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 302. 
65 Id. at 1 29 1 .  
66 Id. at 1 297. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1 295. 
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distance whatsoever between the recited correlations and their practical 
application. Yet because the Court sees the correlations themselves as natural 
laws, it fails to recognize that the claimed invention - as is - is an entirely 
practical and specific contribution to applied technology, ready for immediate 
use. 
Perhaps the Court does not recognize diagnosis alone (as distinguished from 
treatment) as an application. Elsewhere the Court notes that the District 
Court's interpretation of the claim does not include as an element the step of 
actually adjusting the drug dosage, and that the claim would therefore be 
infringed by making the diagnostic determination that the dosage should be 
adjusted even without following through by modifying the course of 
treatment. 70 Perhaps that is why the Court sees the claim as nothing more than 
the recital of a law of nature followed by a general instruction to "apply the 
law:"71 Perhaps it is only the therapeutic intervention that the Court would 
recognize as a patent-eligible application of the law. Thus the Court states, 
"[ u ]nlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an existing 
drug, the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of 
those [natural] laws. "72 
The Court's lament that the claims "do not confine their reach" suggests a 
belief that the claims before it are broader than "a typical patent on a new drug 
or a new way of using an existing drug. "73 In fact, such a "typical patent " has a 
broader, not narrower, reach than the Mayo claim. The Mayo claim not only 
specifies a drug limitation (thiopurine) and a use limitation (treatment of 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder), but adds the further limitations of 
(I) measuring a particular biomarker and (2) using a particular algorithm to 
determine the need to adjust the drug dosage. If the Court is worried about the 
impact of the Mayo claim on the search for future applications, it should worry 
more, not less, about the impact of these "typical patents" on the same type of 
research. The Mayo claim is a narrowing refinement of a particular application 
rather than a new scientific discovery that has not yet been reduced to a 
particular application. 
Elsewhere the Court seems to recognize the narrow scope of the claim, but 
insists that this does not save it from invalidity because it follows from the 
narrow scope of the underlying "natural law": 
The underlying functional concern here is a relative one: how 
much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the 
contribution of the inventor . . . . A patent upon a narrow law 
70 Id. at 1 296. Professor Holman explains the divided infringement problem for claims 
to diagnostic methods in Christopher M. Holman, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place: How Limelight Compounds the Challenges Facing Biotechnology Innovators After 
Mayo and Myriad, 33 BtOTECH. L. REP. 1 35-38 (20 14). See infra note 84. 
71 See supra note 6 1  and accompanying text. 
72 Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 302. 
13 Id. 
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of nature may not inhibit future research as seriously as 
would a patent upon Einstein's law of relativity, but the 
creative value of the discovery is also considerably smaller. 
And, as we have previously pointed out, even a narrow law of 
nature (such as the one before us) can inhibit future 
research. 74 
Of course, any patent can inhibit research. But the intuitive appeal of 
keeping basic building blocks such as natural laws outside the patent system is 
that, because they are so basic, patents on natural laws could inhibit research 
into many different applications. Thus the Court suggests that the danger posed 
by patents on "new laws of nature .. . becomes acute when a patented process 
amounts to no more than an instruction to 'apply the natural law,' or otherwise 
forecloses more future invention than the underlying discovery could 
reasonably justify. "75 If the underlying concern is that a nonspecific directive 
to "apply the natural law" could foreclose a broader range of future innovation 
than the underlying discovery justifies, then the specificity of the application 
recited in the claim would seem to address that concern directly. But because 
the Court sees the diagnostic inference recited in the claim as a natural law, it 
fails to recognize that the claim recites a very specific diagnostic application. 
Perhaps the Court would have recognized the claimed invention as an 
application if it had included the steps of raising or lowering the drug dosage 
as actual claim elements (rather than merely reciting when such an adjustment 
is indicated in the "wherein " clauses at the end of the claim). Such a claim 
would look more like "a typical patent on . . .  a new way of using an existing 
drug. "76 But diagnosis and treatment are distinct aspects of healthcare and may 
be performed by different actors. As diagnostic testing becomes more 
sophisticated, this functional separation between diagnosis and treatment is 
likely to become more common. 
If diagnostic patent claims must include treatment steps, both the healthcare 
provider that performs only the treatment steps and the laboratory that 
performs only the diagnostic steps may avoid infringement liability. 77 A new 
diagnostic that guides the choice of treatment is itself a valuable contribution 
to healthcare that may be worthy of a patent even if the resulting treatment is 
entirely conventional. The conceptual separation between diagnosis and 
treatment is not the same as the distinction between natural laws and specific 
applications of those laws. Diagnosis is itself an application. 
74 Id. at 1 303. 
75 Id. at 1 30 1 .  
76 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
77 When different actors perform different steps of a patented method they may each 
avoid infringement liability. It is easy to avoid infringement liability for a patented method 
performed by different actors none of which controls the other's behavior. See Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 1 34 S. Ct. 2 1 1 1  (2014). 
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SEARCHING FOR ANOTHER RATIONALE 
Mental Steps and Abstract Ideas 
The distinction between diagnostic and treatment steps roughly corresponds 
to a distinction between observation and analysis on one hand and tangible 
medical intervention on the other hand. The Court mentions repeatedly that the 
Mayo claim does not include treatment steps and could therefore be infringed 
by mere thoughts, 78 although it does not rest its holding of patent-ineligibility 
on that basis. But perhaps the fact that the core diagnostic inference takes the 
form of analysis of information rather than tangible physical steps plays a 
larger role in the Court's judgment than it plays in its opinion. 79 
Some subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have followed the lead of the 
Supreme Court to invalidate diagnostic method claims, but have not relied on 
the exclusion of laws of nature to reach that result. Instead, they have relied 
upon the exclusion for "abstract ideas." 
The first post-Mayo decision of the Federal Circuit on the patent-eligibility 
of diagnostic methods was Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 80 a 
case better known for its challenge to product claims associated with the 
BRCAl and BRCA2 genes. A previous Federal Circuit decision in that case81 
was pending before the Supreme Court at the time of the Mayo decision, and 
was vacated and remanded to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of 
78 See, e.g. , Mayo, 1 32 S. Ct. at 1 296 ("The District Court also accepted Prometheus' 
view that a doctor using Mayo's test could violate the patent even ifhe did not actually alter 
his treatment decision in the light of the test. In doing so, the court construed the claim's 
language, 'indicates a need to decrease' (or 'to increase'), as not limited to instances in  
which the doctor actually decreases (or increases) the dosage level where the test results 
suggest that such an adjustment is advisable. "); id. at 1 302 (" . . .  the patent claims . . .  tell a 
treating doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the resulting measurements in  
l ight of the statistical relationships they describe. In doing so, they tie up the doctor's  
subsequent treatment decision whether that treatment does, or  does not, change in light of 
the inference he has drawn using the correlations."). 
79 Professor Kevin Collins argues that although on its "rhetorical surface" the 
Prometheus opinion is about natural laws, it might be better analyzed in terms of other 
exclusions from patentable subject matter for "mental steps" and "printed matter." Kevin E. 
Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 Hous. L. REV. 391 
(201 3). See also Kevin E.  Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1 279 (20 1 4). 
80 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1 303 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), ajJ'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3). 
81 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 653 F.3d 1 329 (Fed. Cir. 201 1 )  cert. 
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 1 32 S. Ct. 1 794 (20 12) and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom. Ass'n. for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P. T. O.,  467 F. App 'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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Mayo. 82 The Supreme Court later reviewed the decision on the product claims 
only, 83 leaving the Federal Circuit's analysis of the method claims as the final 
word on the patent-eligibility of those claims. Although the Federal Circuit 
panel was divided on the proper analysis of the product claims to DNA 
sequences, 84 there was no disagreement about the method claims. 85 
Most of the method claims covered methods of comparing a patient's 
BRCAI or BRCA2 sequence to the normal sequence to detect mutations 
associated with predisposition to develop cancer. 86 The panel agreed that these 
method claims were ineligible for patent protection. It would have been a 
simple matter to explain this result as a straightforward application of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Prometheus v. Mayo, given the similarities 
between the two cases. Yet the court explicitly based its decision instead on the 
reasoning in its own previous opinion87 - the one vacated by the Supreme 
Court - that the claims were improperly drawn to "abstract mental processes ": 
This court in its now-vacated decision of July 29, 201 1 ,  had 
held [the method claims]-all of which consist of analyzing 
and comparing certain DNA sequences-not to be patent­
eligible subject matter on the ground that they claim only 
abstract mental processes. In light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mayo, we reaffirm that prior holding. The Court 
82 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d. at 1 303. 
83 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3). 
84 Each member of the three-judge panel wrote separately. Ass 'n for Molecular 
Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1 308, 1 325-33 (Lourie, J . )  (holding that all of the product claims are 
patent-eligible because neither isolated BRCAl and BRCA2 DNA molecules nor BRCAl 
and BRCA2 cDNA molecules occurs in nature) ;  id at 1 337, 1 340-47 (Moore, J., concurring 
in part) (concurring in the judgment on the ground that longstanding PTO practice of 
allowing such claims should not be set aside without Congressional action); id. at 1 348 
(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in the judgment with 
respect to cDNA claims but not claims to isolated DNA that is not materially different from 
native DNA). 
85 Id. at 1 337 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (joining the majority with respect to the 
method claims at issue); id. at 1 348 (Bryson, J . ,  concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(concurring with the portions of the court's judgment that are directed to the patentability of 
the method claims). 
86 Id. at 1 309- 1 0  (majority opinion) (For example, a representative claim recited: "A 
method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCAI gene, said alteration selected from 
the group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 1 2A, 1 4, 1 8  or 1 9  in a human 
which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA 1 gene or BRCA I RNA from a human 
sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCAl cDNA made from mRNA from said human 
sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion of 4 nucleotides 
corresponding to base numbers 4 1 84-87 of SEQ ID NO: ! ") (citing U.S. Patent No. 
5,7 1 0,00 1) .  
87 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 653 F .3d 1 329, 1 333 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 1 ) 
aff d in part, rev 'd in part sub nom; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3) (referring to its reasoning in 653 F.3d 1 329 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 1 )). 
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made clear that such diagnostic methods in that case 
essentially claim natural laws that are not eligible for patent. 
Without expressly analyzing the instant method claims in the 
context of the Court's reasoning, but in light of the Court's 
holding, and in view of our own prior reasoning, set forth 
herein below, those method claims cannot stand. 88 
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Although it may seem insubordinate to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning 
even when it does not change the result, the Federal Circuit has continued to 
use the exclusions for "mental steps " and "abstract ideas" as the basis for 
invalidating diagnostic method claims, sometimes in decisions issued as 
"unpublished or nonprecedential." For example, in PerkinElmer v. Intema,89 
the Federal Circuit cited both the Supreme Court's decision in Mayo and its 
own decision in Myriad Genetics to invalidate claims to a noninvasive prenatal 
screening method to detect increased risk of having a fetus with Down 
syndrome. 90 The Court observed that the claims "recite mental processes and 
natural laws " and that "as in Mayo, there is no requirement that a doctor act on 
the calculated risk."91 In its "unpublished or nonprecedential " decision in 
Smartgene v. Advanced Biological Laboratories,92 the Federal Circuit relied on 
its own prior decisions excluding "mental steps " from patent eligibility to 
invalidate a very broad claim to a computer-implemented "method for guiding 
the selection of a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known 
disease or medical condition." While taking note of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mayo, the court did not characterize the claims before it as reciting 
natural laws. 93 
88 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1 303, 1 333 (Fed. 
Cir. 20 1 2). 
89 Perkin Elmer, Inc. v.  Intema, Ltd. ,  496 Fed. Appx. 65, 72 (Fed. Cir. 201 2). 
90 Id. at 66-67 (Representative Claim I reads as follows: "A method of determining 
whether a pregnant woman is at an increased risk of having a fetus with Down's syndrome, 
the method comprising the steps of: measuring the level of at least one screening marker 
from a first trimester of pregnancy by: (i) assaying a sample . . .  ; and/or (ii) measuring at 
least one first ultrasound screening marker from an ultrasound scan . . .  ; measuring the level 
of at least one second screening marker from a second trimester of pregnancy, the at least 
one second screening marker from the second trimester of pregnancy being different from 
the at least one first screening marker from the first trimester of pregnancy, by: (i) assaying 
a sample . . .  ; and/or (ii) measuring at least one second ultrasound screening marker from an 
ultrasound scan . . .  ; and determining the risk of Down's syndrome by comparing the 
measured levels of both the at least one first screening marker from the first trimester of 
pregnancy and the at least one second screening marker from the second trimester of 
pregnancy with observed relative frequency distributions of marker levels in Down's 
syndrome pregnancies and in unaffected pregnancies"). 
91 Id. at 70-7 1 .  
92 SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., 555 Fed. Appx. 950, 95 1 -53 (Fed. Cir. 
20 1 4). 
93 Id. at 955 ("The Supreme Court in Mayo, though addressing a case involving the ' law 
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More recently the Federal Circuit used the exclusion for "abstract ideas " to 
invalidate another set of diagnostic method claims related to the BRCAl and 
BRCA2 breast cancer genes that had not been at issue in the earlier Myriad 
litigation in its decision in In re BRCAJ- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer 
Test Patent Litigation. 94 The defendant argued that the Mayo case was directly 
on point, but the court avoided agreeing with that characterization: "We need 
not decide if Mayo is directly on point here because the method claims before 
us suffer from a separate infirmity: they recite abstract ideas. "95 The court 
relied on its own prior decision in Myriad to conclude that the claim steps of 
"comparing "  and "analyzing " DNA sequences recited patent-ineligible 
"abstract ideas, "96 then turned to the Supreme Court's more recent analysis in 
Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank97 to conclude that other claim elements did not 
add enough to the patent-ineligible abstract ideas to make the claim as a whole 
patent-eligible. 98 
If both natural laws and abstract ideas are patent-ineligible, and if the 
scrutiny of additional claim elements in the second step of the analysis is the 
same either way, in many cases it may not matter which of the traditional 
exclusions the court relies upon. Although none of these terms has been clearly 
defined, there is likely some redundancy in the list of exclusions. 
But the exclusions may not be identical, and the choice of exclusion might 
therefore sometimes change the outcome. For example, consider the following 
claim to a method of screening cancer therapeutics, which the Federal Circuit 
held patent-eligible in its Myriad decision on remand from the Supreme 
of nature' exclusion from section 1 0  I ,  recognized that 'mental processes' and 'abstract 
ideas' (whatever may be the precise definition and relation of those concepts) are excluded 
from section I O I .  . . .  Whatever the boundaries of the 'abstract ideas' category, the claim at 
issue here involves a mental process excluded from section I 0 I :  the mental steps of 
comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify medical options."). 
94 In re BRCAI -and-BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 
764 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 4) (As set forth in the opinion, the patent claims "A method for screening 
germline of a human subject for an alteration of a BRCA I gene which comprises comparing 
germline sequence of a BRCAI gene or BRCAI RNA from a tissue sample from said 
subject or a sequence of BRCAI cDNA made from mRNA from said sample with germline 
sequences of wild-type BRCAI gene, wild-type BRCAI RNA or wild-type BRCAl cDNA, 
wherein a difference in the sequence of the BRCAI gene, BRCAI RNA or BRCAI cDNA 
of the subject from wild-type indicates an alteration in the BRCA I gene in said subject[,] 
Wherein a germline nucleic acid sequence is compared by hybridizing a BRCA l gene probe 
which specifically hybridizes to a BRCAI allele to genomic DNA isolated from said sample 
and detecting the presence of a hybridization product wherein a presence of said product 
indicates the presence of said allele in the subject"). Id. at 76 1 .  
95 Id. at 762. 
96 Id. at 763 . 
97 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank lnt'I., 1 34 S. Ct. 2347 (20 1 4). 
98 In re BRCA l-and-BRCA2, 774 F.3d at 764. This second step of the analysis was quite 
similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in Mayo. 
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A method for screening potential cancer therapeutics which 
comprises: growing a transformed eukaryotic host cell 
containing an altered BRCAl gene causing cancer in the 
presence of a compound suspected of being a cancer 
therapeutic, growing said transformed eukaryotic host cell in 
the absence of said compound, determining the rate of growth 
of said host cell in the presence of said compound and the 
rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said 
compound and comparing the growth rate of said host cells, 
wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell in the 
presence of said compound is indicative of a cancer 
therapeutic. 100 
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The court considered this claim patent-eligible, emphasizing its use of a 
transformed host cell "derived by altering a cell to include a foreign gene, 
resulting in a man-made, transformed cell with enhanced function and 
utility. " 101 Since the claimed process was carried out in cells that are not 
naturally occurring, "[t]he fact that the claim also includes the steps of 
determining the cells' growth rates and comparing growth rates does not 
change the fact that the claim is based on a man-made, non-naturally occurring 
transformed cell-patent-eligible subject matter." 1 02 
In other words, although the claim recited mental steps that were excluded 
from patent-eligibility, because the claim also involved use of a man-made, 
transformed host cell, the court saw it as a patent-eligible application. 
This analysis is in some tension with Mayo. There are notable similarities 
between the BRCAl drug screening claim and the "method of optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy" claim that the Mayo Court held invalid (and in light of 
which it asked the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in Myriad). Both 
claims involve use of a drug to trigger its effects - administering thiopurine to 
a patient in Mayo, and exposing cells to a "compound suspected of being a 
cancer therapeutic " in Myriad. Both involve measuring drug effects -
metabolite levels in Mayo and growth rate of cells in Myriad - and comparing 
resulting values to a standard - the metabolite levels set forth in the "wherein " 
clauses in Mayo and the observed growth rate of cells that have not been 
exposed to the compound in Myriad. And both involve drawing certain 
inferences about the effects of the drug, recited in the "wherein" recitals at the 
end of the claim. Presumably in both cases the reaction of the patient or cells to 
the drug is "entirely natural " once you ignore the prior human intervention that 
set the stage for observing these entirely natural processes. And in both claims 
the process steps are entirely conventional apart from the excluded subject 
99 See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. 
1 00 U.S.  Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 1 56. 1 .  1 4-27 (filed May 5, 1 998). 
1 01 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O., 689 F.3d 1 303, 1 336 (Fed. Cir. 201 2). 
1 02 Id. 
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matter. 
Judge Lourie's opinion focused on the fact that the drug screening method 
recited the use of a transformed host cell with an altered BRCAl gene that 
does not occur in nature. But patients who have been treated with thiopurine 
drugs also do not occur in nature. And if determining how to adjust the dosage 
of a drug does not count as an application of the laws of nature that determine 
drug effects, then surely the determination that a particular screened compound 
exhibits drug effects in a laboratory setting is even further removed from any 
practical application. 
The more important difference between the two cases is not the role of 
nature, but rather the choice of which exclusion defined the starting points in 
the analysis. Judge Lourie began by excluding mental steps rather than natural 
laws, leaving the claim step of growing transformed host cells available for 
consideration as an additional element that might save the patent-eligibility of 
the claim overall. Framed this way, it was easy to conclude that the claim 
"includes more than the abstract mental step of looking at two numbers and 
"comparing" two host cells' growth rates." 103 Although the opinion, which was 
primarily concerned with the patentability of natural products, characterized 
the transformed host cells as "not naturally occurring," it seemed to matter 
more to Judge Lourie that the claim included physically transformative process 
steps in addition to mental steps: 
[O]nce one has determined that a claimed composition of 
matter is patent-eligible subject matter, applying various 
known types of procedures to it is not merely applying 
conventional steps to a law of nature. The transformed, man­
made nature of the underlying subject matter in claim 20 
makes the claim patent-eligible. The fact that the claim also 
includes the steps of determining the cells' growth rates and 
comparing growth rates does not change the fact that the 
claim is based on a man-made, non-naturally occurring 
transformed cell-patent-eligible subject matter.104 
It is difficult to figure out exactly how the "man-made nature of the 
underlying subject matter" relates to the exclusion of the mental steps of 
"determining" and "comparing" in this passage. Perhaps if the patent 
challengers in the Myriad case had chosen to appeal the Federal Circuit's 
decision on the drug screening method, the Court would have held that claim 
be patent-ineligible, and would have admonished the Federal Circuit to follow 
its teachings in Mayo v. Prometheus concerning natural processes. But the 
Court might instead have held that, although the Federal Circuit used the 
wrong analytical approach, it correctly concluded that the drug screening 
method was patent-eligible subject matter. The correct analysis under Mayo 
might have begun by excluding as "purely natural laws" the reactions of the 
1 03 Id. 
104 Id. 
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host cells to the candidate drugs, and then considered whether the step of 
growing the transformed host cells was sufficiently novel and unconventional 
to make the claim overall patent-eligible. 
Although the Supreme Court did not review the Federal Circuit's analysis of 
the method claims in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
its review of the product claims paid no more attention than the Federal Circuit 
had paid to the approach set forth in Justice Breyer's opinion in Mayo. 1 05 The 
Court held that "isolated DNA" that (apart from its isolation) was otherwise 
identical to naturally occurring DNA within chromosomes (gDNA) was a 
product of nature and therefore patent-ineligible, but that "synthetically created 
DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which . . .  omits certain 
portions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins" is patent 
eligible "because it is not naturally occurring."106 The Myriad opinion cited 
Mayo for the principle that the exclusion of "laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas" must not be interpreted so broadly as to 
eviscerate patent law, 107 but it did not pursue the second step of the Mayo 
analysis to search for an additional "inventive concept" in the claim to be sure 
that it covered a patent-eligible application rather than the excluded matter 
itself. The distinction between patent-eligible cDNA and patent-ineligible 
gDNA instead appeared to rest entirely on the Court's understanding that 
gDNA is naturally occurring, 108 while cDNA is made in the laboratory.109 Had 
the Court subjected the claims to the second step of the Mayo analysis, it might 
have concluded that the process of creating cDNA from naturally occurring 
messenger RNA is as routine and conventional as the process of creating 
isolated genomic DNA.110 But because the Court was satisfied that cDNA is 
synthetically created, it did not matter that the method of creating it was 
routine and conventional. 
Of course, the more important outcome of the Myriad litigation for the 
patenting of diagnostics is not the patent-eligibility of some drug screening 
methods, but rather the patent-ineligibility of naturally-occurring biomarkers 
1 05 For an interesting critical analysis of the Myriad decision and its inattention to 
Prometheus, see generally Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in 
Myriad Genetics, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 505 (2014). 
1 06 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07, 2 1 1 1  
(20 1 3). 
to7 Id. at 2 1 1 6. 
tos Id. at 2 1 1 7 ("Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and 
useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of 
invention."). 
1 09 Id. at 21 1 9  ("cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patenting as naturally 
occurring, isolated DNA segments . . . .  the lab technician unquestionably creates something 
new when cDNA is made.") For an excellent critique of this distinction, see generally 
Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in Molecular 
Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 1 5  N.C. J.L. & Tech. 639 (201 4). 
i to Id at 655-56. 
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and methods of analyzing and comparing a patient's biomarker to a recited 
sequence. In broad terms, Mayo invalidates patents on diagnostic methods, 
while Myriad invalidates patents on diagnostic markers. But the survival of the 
drug screening method in Myriad left room, in theory, for the possibility that a 
future diagnostic method might be patent-eligible if it makes use of human­
made materials incorporating biomarkers. 
Diagnostics vs. Therapeutics 
The Supreme Court opinions in Mayo and Myriad share an important 
similarity in consequence: each has the effect of excluding diagnostic 
applications from patent protection, while preserving the patent-eligibility of 
therapeutic applications. The Court comes close to articulating this distinction 
in Mayo, when it compares the claim at issue to "a typical patent on a new drug 
or a new way of using an existing drug" 1 1 1  and when it points to the fact that 
infringement of the claim would not require that a doctor actually modify the 
course of treatment. 1 12 The implication is that more typical patents on drugs 
and methods of using drugs are patent-eligible applications, in contrast to the 
less typical patent at issue, which could be infringed by merely making a 
diagnostic inference without "applying it" to change the course of treatment. 
The distinction between diagnostics and therapeutics is less obvious in the 
Myriad case, although the effect of excluding isolated gDNA from patent 
protection while leaving cDNA and other recombinant DNA constructs patent­
eligible is to prevent the patenting of many diagnostic markers while 
preserving the availability of a form of patent claim that - at least in the past -
has been more valuable for developers of therapeutic products. Although the 
Court did not explicitly say this, some amicus briefs explained it to the 
Court. 113 For example, the first generation of biotechnology products were 
therapeutic proteins (such as insulin, human growth hormone and 
1 1 1  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
1 12 See supra note 78. 
1 13 See, e.g., Brief for Eric S.  Lander as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass'n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S .  Ct. 2 1 07 (No. 1 2-398), 20 1 3  WL 
263 1 062 at *27, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs­
v2/1 2-398_neither_amcu_lander.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.ccNF9V­
PEA V) ("The vast majority of the medically and commercially important biotechnology 
products developed over the past quarter century are protected by patents on . . . non-natu ral 
compositions of matter, such as cDNA and recombinant DNA molecules -for such uses as 
artificially producing therapeutic proteins. Only a small fraction of products involve 
diagnostic claims to naturally occurring genomic DNA"). Cf Brief of the Coalition for 2 1 st 
Century Medicine as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 3 3  S. 
Ct. 2 1 07 (No. 1 2-398), WL 263 1 062 at * 1 2- 1 7, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs­
v2/l 2-398_resp_amcu_c2 1  cm.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/ AFV8-
WPHQ) (explaining the importance of gene patents to developers of diagnostic products). 
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erythropoietin) produced in recombinant organisms that incorporated a cDNA 
molecule as a template for protein production. For purposes of protein 
production, what matters is the protein-encoding regions of a gene that are 
retained in the cDNA molecule. Patents on the cDNA sequence (or on 
recombinant constructs or host cells engineered to express the protein encoded 
by the cDNA sequence) were enough to allow their owners to exclude 
competitors from producing the therapeutic protein through recombinant DNA 
technology, thereby making these products profitable. Patents on human-made 
constructs incorporating a gene might also be valuable to a firm seeking to 
develop gene therapy products. But for diagnostic purposes it is necessary to 
compare the DNA in a patient's tissue sample to sequences that are predictive 
of disease. It is thus important to use markers that correspond to portions of 
naturally occurring variations of the sequence in order to create a valid test. If 
the marker for disease susceptibility is not in a coding region of the gene, the 
cDNA version will not do the job. 1 14 
The United States as amicus curiae argued that cDNA should be patent­
eligible, while gDNA should not, 1 1 5 a position that was ultimately persuasive 
to the Supreme Court. Professor Christopher Holman has suggested that the 
resonance of this distinction derives in part from the relatively compelling 
economic case for allowing cDNA claims to provide effective patent 
protection for therapeutic products.116 
A similar de facto distinction appears in decisions of the Federal Circuit. For 
example, in its pre-Mayo decision in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen, 117 
1 14 See supra note 94, at 761 (noting if the relevant mutation is in a coding region, 
cDNA may be a useful marker. Thus the broadly worded B RCAI diagnostic screening 
method claims held patent-ineligible in In re BRCA I- and BRCA 2-Based Hereditary Cancer 
Test Patent Litigation called in the alternative for the use in testing of"germline sequence of 
a BRCAI gene or BRCAI RNA from a tissue sample from said subject or a sequence of 
BRCAI cDNA made from mRNA from said sample with germline sequences of wild-type 
BRCA I gene, wild-type BRCAI RNA or wild-type B RCAl cDNA"). 
1 15 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (No. 1 2-398), 201 3  WL 
263 1 062 at *7- 1 4, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs­
v2/ I 2-398_neither_amcu_us.authcheckdam.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/3ASB-J8DD). 
1 16 Holman, supra note I 09, at 66 1 ("cDNA is widely used in drug discovery and drug 
production, and one can suspect that the government used a distinction between cDNA and 
genomic DNA as a proxy for a distinction between drugs and diagnostic testing, and the 
Court acquiesced in this policy determination."); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the 
Gene Patenting Controversy Persists, 77 ACAD. MED. 1 38 1 ,  1 382-83 (2002) (discussing the 
different roles played by DNA sequence patents in the development of therapeutics and 
diagnostics). 
1 17 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1 057, 1 060 (Fed. Cir. 
201 1 ), cert. denied sub nom. GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, 1 33 S.  Ct. 973 
(20 1 3). The Federal Circuit's previous decision in Classen lmmunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen 
IDEC was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court' s  
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the Federal Circuit considered the patent-eligibility of several claims related to 
the inventor's theory "that the schedule of infant immunization for infectious 
diseases can affect the later occurrence of chronic immune-mediated 
disorders." 1 1 8 The court upheld the patent-eligibility of two claims that recited 
a two-step "method of immunizing a mammalian subject" that involved, first, 
reviewing data on the effects of different immunization schedules to determine 
which schedule presents a lower risk of developing a chronic immune­
mediated disorder, and second, immunizing a subject in accordance with the 
lower-risk schedule. 1 19  At the same time, the court rejected as patent-ineligible 
a claim to a "method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects 
the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder" by using that 
immunization schedule in a treatment group and comparing to results in a 
control group. 120 The court explained the difference by noting that the patent­
eligible methods included "the physical step of immunization on the 
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (201 0). Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen 
IDEC, 1 30 S .  Ct. 3541 (20 1 0). 
1 1 8 Classen lmmunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d. at 1 060. 
1 19 More specifically, the court set forth the following representative claim language: " I .  
A method of immunizing a mammalian subject which comprises: (I) screening a plurality of 
immunization schedules, by (a) identifying a first group of mammals and at least a second 
group of mammals, said mammals being of the same species, the first group of mammals 
having been immunized with one or more doses of one or more infectious disease-causing 
organism-associated immunogens according to a first screened immunization schedule, and 
the second group of mammals having been immunized with one or more doses of one or 
more infectious disease-causing organism-associated immunogens according to a second 
screened immunization schedule, each group of mammals having been immunized 
according to a different immunization schedule, and (b) comparing the effectiveness of said 
first and second screened immunization schedules in protecting against or inducing a 
chronic immune-mediated disorder in said first and second groups, as a result of which one 
of said screened immunization schedules may be identified as a lower risk screened 
immunization schedule and the other of said screened schedules as a higher risk screened 
immunization schedule with regard to the risk of developing said chronic immune mediated 
disorder(s), (II) immunizing said subject according to a subject immunization schedule, 
according to which at least one of said infectious disease-causing organism-associated 
immunogens of said lower risk schedule is administered in accordance with said lower risk 
screened immunization schedule, which administration is associated with a lower risk of 
development of said chronic immune-mediated disorder(s) than when said immunogen was 
administered according to said higher risk screened immunization schedule." Id. at 1 060-61 .  
1 20 More specifically, the court set forth the claim language as follows: "A method of 
determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic 
immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of 
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with 
one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, 
and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune­
mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with 
that in the control group." Id. at 1 06 1 .  
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determined schedule."12 1  Therefore, they were "directed to a specific tangible 
application," while the patent-ineligible method "claims the idea of comparing 
known immunization results . . . but does not require using this information for 
immunization purposes." 122 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Moore disagreed with 
the majority's interpretation of the claim that it held patent-ineligible. Properly 
interpreted, Judge Moore explained, that claim also recites an immunization 
step as part of the method of determining the effects of the immunization 
schedule. 123 Nonetheless, the majority interpreted the word "immunizing" 
differently in the different patents: "[t]he 'immunizing' in the '283 patent [held 
patent-ineligible] refers to the gathering of published data, while the 
immunizing of the ' 1 39 and '739 patent claims [held patent-eligible] is the 
physical implementation of the mental step claimed in the '283 patent. " 124 
Whether or not this interpretation is plausible, the analysis reveals a clear view 
that treatment is patent-eligible, but analysis of data is not. 
The Federal Circuit cited Classen with approval in its post-Mayo decision, 
PerkinElmer v. Intema. 1 25 In that case, the court held patent-ineligible patent 
claims to a method of determining whether a pregnant woman is at increased 
risk of having a fetus with Down syndrome that did not include a "requirement 
that a doctor act on the calculated risk." 126 Again, mere diagnosis without 
treatment steps was not patent-eligible. 
None of these decisions purports to rest on a policy decision that 
therapeutics should be patentable and diagnostics should not. Quite the 
contrary, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit insist that patent 
policy decisions are the domain of Congress, and that they are merely applying 
longstanding principles of patent law to the cases before them. 127 Yet a 
distinction between therapeutics and diagnostics seems to lurk beneath the 
surface of decisions that rest more explicitly on other distinctions. Whether the 
courts talk about laws of nature versus applications of those laws, or natural 
121 Id. at I 066. 
1 22 Id. at 1 066-67. 
1 23 Id. at 1 076-77 n. 1 .  (Moore, J. dissenting). 
1 24 Id. at 1 067. 
1 25 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
1 26 PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App'x 65, 7 1  (Fed. Cir. 20 1 2). 
1 27 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. ,  Inc., 1 32 S.  Ct. 1 289, 1 305 
(20 1 2) ("[W]e must hesitate before departing from established general legal rules lest a new 
protective rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in 
another. And we must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules 
where necessary . . . .  We need not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, 
increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable."); Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U .S.P.T.O., 689 F.3d at 1 303, 1 324 (Fed. Cir. 20 1 2) ("[P]atents on 
life-saving material and processes, involving large amounts of risky investment, would seem 
to be precisely the types of subject matter that should be subject to the incentives of 
exclusive rights. But disapproving of patents on medical methods and novel biological 
molecules are policy questions best left to Congress . . . .  "). 
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products versus man-made materials, or abstract ideas versus physically 
transformative processes, or mental steps versus tangible applications, the 
result is remarkably consistent: diagnostic applications do not count as patent­
eligible subject matter. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Although the courts have not purported to decide on policy grounds to 
exclude diagnostic applications from the patent system, they have made their 
decisions against the backdrop of a lively debate about the impact of such 
patents on innovation and patient access to testing. Much of this debate has 
focused on patents related to genetic discoveries.128 As the Human Genome 
Project got underway in the 1990s, an increase in gene patents 1 29 caused 
concerns about the impact of patents on biomedical research and on the 
availability of genetic testing services. 130 Some empirical studies showed 
fewer effects on research than had been feared, 13 1  but other studies showed 
significant negative effects of patents on the development of diagnostic tests 
and availability of testing services. 132 
The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society 
("SACGHS"), chartered in the fall of 2002 to provide advice and 
1 28 See, e.g., SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMI C  RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006) [HEREINAFTER NRC STUDY] ; DAVID B. 
RESNIK, OWNING THE GENOME: A MORAL ANALYSIS OF DNA PATENTING (2004); Caulfield, 
et al., supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 09 1 -94; David Korn & Stephen J. Heinig, eds., Public versus 
Private Ownership of Scientific Discovery: legal and Economic Analyses of the 
Implications of Human Gene Patents, 77 ACAD. MED. 1 30 1  (2002). 
129 NRC Study, supra note 1 28, at 1 0 1 -02. 
1 30 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENETICS, GENOMICS, AND THE PATENTING OF DNA: 
REVIEW OF POTENTIAL I M PLICATIONS FOR HEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005); U.K. 
PUBLIC HEALTH GENETICS UNIT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GENETICS (2004); 
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N., REPORT 99 - GENES AND INGENUITY: GENE PATENTING AND 
HUMAN HEALTH (2004); DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, PATENTING HUMAN GENES AND STEM 
CELLS (2004); ONT. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, GENETICS, TESTING AND GENE PATENTING: 
CHARTING NEW TERRITORY IN HEALTHCARE (2002); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE 
ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2002); 0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
AND DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, & LICENSING PRACTICES: 
EVIDENCE AND POLICIES (2002); NRC STUDY, SUPRA NOTE 1 28; SACGHS Final Report, 
supra note 24; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 1 12-29, § 27 1 25 
Stat. 284, 338 (20 1 1 )  (referring to Congressional directive to PTO to study "effective ways 
to provide independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene patents and 
exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist and to report back to 
Congress). 
1 3 1 See Eisenberg, supra note 2 1  (providing a summary of the evidence); see also 
Caulfield et al . ,  supra note 2 1 .  
132 E.g., Cho et al., supra note 23; Merz et al . ,  supra note 23. 
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recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on issues 
raised by developments in human genetics, conducted a study of the role of 
gene patenting and licensing practices in patient access to genetic tests as  one 
of its first priorities. 133 The final report of the SACGHS study was published in 
20 1 0, shortly before the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mayo and Myriad, 
and was cited in many briefs submitted in those cases. 134 
The primary focus of the report was on access to clinical testing rather than 
on incentives for research. Nonetheless, recognizing that access to testing 
depends on adequate incentives to conduct basic genetic research and to 
develop tests, the Committee also undertook to study the effects of gene 
patents on R&D incentives. 135 Although acknowledging that "[s]trongly held 
opposing viewpoints .. . [were] expressed throughout the Committee's 
inquiry,'' 136 the Committee concluded that "patent-derived exclusive rights are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the development of genetic test 
kits and laboratory-developed tests. " 137 The Committee also found "that the 
patenting and licensing of genetic tests has limited the ability of clinical 
laboratories to offer genetic testing " with detrimental effects on "patient 
access, the quality of testing, and efforts to innovate. "  l38 
133 SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24, at ix-x. 
134 See Brief for 2 1 st Century Medicine as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
2 1 ,  Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , 1 33 S. Ct. 2 107 (20 1 3) (No. 
1 2-398); Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Ass'n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Academics in Law, 
Medicine, Health Policy, and Clinical Genetics as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 
3 ,  Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , 1 33 S .  Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brieffor 
American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Ass'n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Canavan 
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 2, Ass'n Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 107 (20 1 3); Brief for Genformatic LLC as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
1 33 S.  Ct. 2 I 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Int'! Center for Technology Assessment et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17 ,  Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc., 
1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for Knowledge Ecology Int'I as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 1 0, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 
(20 1 3); Brief for National Women's Health Network et al .  as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 1 3, Ass'n Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 
(20 1 3); Brief for Professor Eileen M. Kane as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 1 33 S. Ct. 2 1 07 (20 1 3); Brief for 
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 1 8, Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 3 1  S. Ct. 3027 (20 1 I ); Brief for The 
American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1 5, 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 1 3 1  S. Ct. 3027 (20 1 I ). 
1 35 SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24, at I .  
1 36 Id. at 8. 
1 37 Id. at 35. 
1 38 Id. at 39. The Committee was particularly concerned about the effects on access and 
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The Committee recommended that Congress provide an exemption from 
patent infringement liability "for anyone who infringes a patent on a gene 
while making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a genetic test for 
patient care purposes. " 139 This "narrowly tailored " exemption would not 
eliminate gene patents, which "would remain available and enforceable for 
therapeutic uses. " 140 Three of the eighteen members of the Committee 
dissented, noting that "the increasing complexity of development and clinical 
testing for genetic tests and higher evidentiary standards and regulatory hurdles 
such tests must meet require increasing levels of investment. "14 1  
Although the SACGHS Final Report does not propose limits o n  patent­
eligibility, the views and evidence set forth in that Report provide some 
support for curtailing patent rights on diagnostic inventions. The study was 
limited to the specific field of genetic testing, and is thus more directly relevant 
to patents on genetic biomarkers such as those at issue in Myriad than it is to 
patents on diagnostic methods of the sort at issue in Mayo. Nonetheless, the 
report points to considerations that may have relevance in weighing the policy 
consequences of excluding diagnostics from patent eligibility. 
First, in its consideration of the possible incentive benefits of patents, the 
report notes that patents on diagnostics are not the only way to motivate 
research on the genetic basis of disease and development of related diagnostic 
products.142 Biomedical research in general, and genomics research in 
particular, have benefited from significant government subsidies that provide 
direct support for research that has facilitated the development of diagnostic 
tests. 143 The report focused on past and current government subsidies as a 
reason to doubt the need for patent-based exclusive rights as a further incentive 
to develop genetic t�sts. But in the wake of the decisions in Mayo and Myriad, 
policy-makers could also consider increased research subsidies as an 
alternative mechanism to fortify incentives to develop personalized 
medicine 144 without having to restore patent eligibility. 
quality when patent holders licensed their rights exclusively to a single provider. Id. at 44-
48. 
139 Id. at 94. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. The dissent is set forth at the end of the report following the appendices in 
unnumbered pages. 
142 Id. at 90; see generally Daniel J. Heme) & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the 
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REv. 303 (201 3) (providing a taxonomy of ways that the 
state can promote research and development, including through research funding, tax 
benefits, and prizes in addition to intellectual property). 
· 
143 See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellete, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent 
Innovation Incentives, U.C. IRVINE L. REv. (forthcoming 20 1 5), available 
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Lee_Peter_IPSC_paper_201 4.pdf (archived at 
http://perma.ccNPP3-6Z95) (manuscript 1 3-2 1 ) .  
144 See Of ice of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet, supra note I (proposing $2 1 5  million in  
federal funding for precision medicine research). 
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The report also notes that private investors in genetics research "appear to 
be rarely focused exclusively on diagnostics,"145 but instead are 
simultaneously pursuing therapeutic product development. The expectation of 
patents on future therapeutic products may therefore motivate research that 
yields diagnostic innovations along the way, even if only the therapeutic 
products are patent-eligible. Although the SACGHS Report focused on genetic 
discoveries made prior to identifying therapeutic products, patent incentives to 
develop therapeutics may also motivate firms to develop diagnostics in other 
contexts as well. One example is companion diagnostics that are developed 
and submitted for FDA approval in tandem with a drug to identify patients for 
whom the drug is likely to be safe and effective. 146 So long as the drug itself is 
patented, the firm may not need separate patent protection on the companion 
diagnostic, especially if the diagnostic helps the firm to get FDA approval and 
to market the drug. On the other hand, in some circumstances the holder of a 
drug patent may worry that use of the diagnostic will diminish profits by 
excluding some patients from the market for the drug. 147 In other words, if we 
rely on the value of patents on therapeutic products to provide an incentive to 
develop unpatentable diagnostics, incentives are likely to be skewed towards 
those diagnostics that enhance profits on therapeutics and away from 
diagnostics that threaten those profits. 
Second, the report notes the importance of development costs, including 
regulatory costs, in assessing the need for patents. 148 For many of the 
laboratory-developed genetic tests (i.e., tests designed, manufactured and used 
within a single laboratory rather than sold for use by others) considered by the 
SACGHS, development costs had been quite low, although development costs 
for FDA-regulated test kits were more substantial. 149 On the basis of a small 
number of case studies, 150 the committee concluded that exclusive rights from 
patents were not necessary for either laboratory-developed tests or test kits, 
although the report acknowledges that regulatory costs might increase in the 
future. 15 1 Indeed, since the release of the SACGHS Report the FDA has 
announced its intention to regulate more laboratory-developed tests than it has 
145 SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24, at 26. 
146 See In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry and Food and 
Drug Administration Staff, FDA, at 7 (Aug. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceD 
ocuments/UCM262327.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/SL 7S-CY JN). 
147 See generally Mark R. Trusheim & Ernst R. Berndt, Economic challenges and 
possible policy actions to advance stratified medicine, 9 PERSONALIZED MED. 4 1 3  (20 1 2). 
148 See SACGHS Final Report, supra note 24. 
149 Id. at 34. 
1 50 Id. The principal example noted in the Report is the willingness of multiple firms to 
develop a test kit for cystic fibrosis without exclusive rights. 
1 5 1 Id. at 35. 
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done in the past, 152 making increased development costs likely in the future. 
Increased FDA regulation is also likely to further enhance the role of drug 
companies in selecting which diagnostics are developed and brought to market. 
These considerations are complex, involving not only patent law but also 
government research funding and FDA regulation. One can understand why 
the courts would hesitate to address explicitly the policy implications of their 
opinions on patent-eligibility. Yet those opinions have reshaped the 
expectations of diagnostics innovators. Congress may be in a better position 
than the courts to adjust the various levers at its disposal to rebalance the 
system of resources, incentives, and costs. If it wishes to accelerate the 
development of personalized medicine, it may have little choice. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent op1mons from the Supreme Court have profoundly reshaped the 
expectations of diagnostics innovators. These opinions use the ambiguous 
vocabulary of old cases excluding "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas" from patenting without defining these terms, leaving some 
confusion about just how far they exclude modem molecular diagnostics. 
Different courts invoke different exclusions in cases that seem otherwise 
indistinguishable. Yet as more cases are decided, for all the inconsistencies in 
their reasoning, a consistent bottom line is emerging: diagnostic technology is 
not patent-eligible. 
Although they have drawn considerable criticism, these decisions follow on 
the heels of policy recommendations from around the world to curtail the 
effects of patents in the field of genetic diagnostics, and they have been 
encouraged and celebrated by organizations of eminent doctors and scientists. 
One can only hope that the celebration is justified, and that the exclusion of 
diagnostics from patent-eligibility will do more to enhance future innovation 
than it does to suppress it. It would be difficult for Congress to undo the 
rulings in the face of so much support. Other moves are available to Congress 
if it wishes to promote diagnostics innovation, including increased federal 
research funding, although Congress has shown little willingness to increase 
discretionary spending in recent years. Perhaps a more likely outcome is that 
future diagnostics innovation will depend increasingly on pharmaceutical 
industry sponsorship. If so, we might be more likely to see the development of 
companion diagnostics that help to sell new patent-protected drugs than we are 
to see the development of tests that identify which of us should forego costly 
treatments. 
1 52 See Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical 
Laboratories: FDA Notification and Medical Device Reporting for Laboratory-Developed 
Tests (LDT's), FDA, at 5-6 (Oct. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev­
gen/documents/document/ucm4 1 6684.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/9ERE-WT AS). 
